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The 2006 Colorado General Assembly passed legislation
adopting a 1,000-year limitation applicable to interests in
trust,practically eliminating the Rule Against Perpetuities
('RAP"). This article discusses the legislation's impact on
the RAP in trust and non-trust situations.

n April 2006, Governor Bill Owens
signed House Bill 06-1137' that included an extensive revision of Colorado's statutory treatment of the Rule
Against Perpetuities ("RAP"). After
grappling with the transitional provisions, Colorado attorneys in the longer
term likely will welcome this release
2
from the so-called "RAP Trap."
Although the application of the RAP
to trusts was the focus of the 2006 legislation, it also clarified the 1991 repeal of
the RAP in "nondonative transfer[s]."3
On the other hand, even after the 20064
amendments, so-called "domestic"
transactions and donative, non-trust interests created by will, deed, or otherwise, remain subject to the ninety-year
wait-and-see regime of prior law, so the
RAP cannot be entirely forgotten. This
article primarily discusses the current
status of the RAP as applied to Colorado
trusts, but will touch on its application
in other contexts, as well.

The Rule Against
Perpetuities Prior to the
2006 Amendments
For almost a century the RAP in Colorado was principally a creation of the
common law, subject to minimal statutory limitations. However, during the last
two decades, the Colorado legislature repeatedly acted to significantly restrict its
application.

The Common Law Rule
A longstanding Colorado statute provides:
the common law of England so far as
the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all acts and statutes of
the British parliament, made in aid or
to supply the defects of the common
law prior to the fourth year of James
the First... shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full
force until repealed by legislative authority.5
The Colorado Supreme Court confirmed
1607 as the fourth year of James the
First.6 The Duke of Norfolk's Case introduced the "modern" RAP in 1682.7 Consequently, Colorado courts adopted the
RAP as a matter of general common law,
without the imperative of the English
8
laws statute.
Harvard law professor John Chipman
Gray's statement of the common law
RAP typically is found in modern judicial opinions, including those in Colorado: "No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." The rule was applied in a handful of Colorado cases and,
until 1991, the statutory responses principally were confined to those adopted in
1943, creating exceptions for cemetery
trusts, 10 and in 1951, for employee benefit trusts."
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The 1991 Colorado Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities Act

principal concern ultimately was addressed in the 2006 amendments disIn 1991, Colorado adopted the Colorado cussed later in this article.
The nondonative transfer exemption
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act
("CSRAP").11The CSRAP was modeled af- left the RAP, as modified in the ninetyter the Uniform Statutory Rule Against year wait-and-see fashion, principally apPerpetuities ("USRAP"), 13 which adopted plicable to donative contexts, such as wills
a ninety-year "wait-and-see" period for in- and trusts, plus nonvested property interterests that violated the common law ests or powers of appointment arising out
of the following specified "domestic" situRAP.
The CSRAP superseded the common ations:
1) a premarital or postmarital agreelaw RAP, 4 and it abolished application of
ment;
the RAP to most "nondonative trans2) a separation or divorce settlement;
fer[s]."15 A "nondonative transfer" is not
3) a spouse's election;
defined in the statute, but the official com4) a similar arrangement arising out of
ments to the USRAP offer that the transa prospective, existing, or previous
actions are "commercial-type" and inmarital relationship between the
clude:
parties;
options ... preemptive rights in the na5) a contract to make or not to revoke a
ture of a right of first refusal,. . . leases
will or trust;
to commence in the future, at a time
6) a contract to exercise or not to exercertain or on the happening of a future
cise a power of appointment;
event, such as the completion of a build7) a transfer in satisfaction of a duty of
ing ...nonvested easements; top leases
support; or
and top deeds with respect to interests
21
8) a reciprocal transfer.
in minerals.16
It seemed that the exemption for nondo- The official comments to the USRAP connative transfers rendered the RAP of no cede that the domestic situations can be
consequence to commercial transactions, 7 nondonative in some cases, but they nevunless the transaction occurred prior to ertheless are not excluded from the rule:
the May 31, 1991 effective date of the "Some types of transactions-although in
statute.18 However, the contours of the some sense supported by consideration
nondonative transfer exemption were un- and hence arguably nondonative-arise
certain, 19 and an article by Denver Uni- out of a domestic situation, and should not22
versity law professor Lucy Marsh raised be excluded from the Statutory Rule."
additional questions.20 Professor Marsh's The upshot is that a spouse's right of first

fe ina
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Fa .' 303-627-9605
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refusal or purchase option, for example,
granted in a marital agreement or separation agreement, would not automatically be excluded from the CSRAP, but would
be subject to the ninety-year wait-and-see
limit if Colorado law otherwise would apply the RAP to such interests. 23
The CSRAP generally was effective only for interests created after May 30, 1991.
However, it provided a reformation remedy for prior interests
that were found to
2
violate the RAP.4
The 1991 ColoradoCommon
Interest Ownership Act
During the 1991 legislative session that
produced the CSRAP, real property legislation was enacted (with a 1992 delayed
effective date) that included an incidental
provision excluding condominiumn, cooperative, and homeowner association rules
and regulations from the application of
the RAP. The Colorado Common Interest
Ownership Act, effective July 1, 1992, expressly states that the RAP does not apply to "defeat any provision of the declaration, bylaws, or rules and regulations." 5

The 1995 Pet Trust Legislation
In 1995, Colorado adopted, with several
significant modifications, the substance of
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") § 2-90726
27
that validates honorary and pet trusts.
With respect to pet trusts, the legislation
overrides doctrine that typically found
such trusts to violate the RAP for lack of a
human measuring life. 28
The 2001 Trust Amendments
The CSRAP was amended in 2001 by
the addition of language exempting a nonvested property interest from being invalid if"[t]he interest is in a trust and all
or part of the income or principal of the
trust may be distributed, in the discretion
of the trustee, to a person who is living
when the trust is created." 29 This language was effective as of June 1, 2001, but
the legislation is silent regarding its impact on existing trusts. 30 The language
placed Colorado in the camp of states permitting perpetual trusts. Nevertheless,
the language was troublesome in several
respects. First, it suggested that a trust
providing only for mandatory distributions would not qualify.3 1 This did not aid
a settlor's dynastic plans that would prefer a strict accumulations phase where no
immediate discretionary distributions are
permitted. 32 It also would disqualify a
more common structure of an income-only
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qualified terminable interest property ply to "invalidate" excluded transactions,
("QTIP") interest 33 for the benefit of a such as nondonative transfers. 39 Third,
spouse, with the remainder passing to a the effective date section is embellished to
generation-skipping trust for descendants. note that the CSRAP not only "superSecond, although a narrow reading of the sedes" the common law RAP, but also
statute would defeat its apparent purpose, "abolishes" it "for nonvested interests creit is not altogether evident that the ex- ated after May 31, 1991." 40
The RAP consequently is no longer apemption continued to apply in perpetuity,
plicable to clearly nondonative transacafter the potential distributees living at
the time the trust was created pass away. tions, as long as Colorado law applies to
Third, it apparently left powers of appoint- the transaction and the interest was created after May 31, 1991. Other claims of
ment subject to the ninety-year limitation
period, short of a perpetual result.34
Before the enactment of the 2006 RAP
legislation, there consequently were at
NATIONAL FIRM,
least three classes of trust future interests
considered from a RAP perspective. The
nature of these classes is helpful in understanding the 2006 legislation. First, trusts
created prior to May 30, 1991 were subject
to the common law RAP. However, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created after May 30, 1991 by
the exercise of a power of appointment
contained in such trusts would be subject
to the CSRAP.35 Second, trusts created after May 30, 1991 and before June 1, 2001
were subject to the niney-year rule 6 of the
CSRAP. Third, trusts created after May
31, 2001 would be subject to ninety-year
CSRAP rule as a default, or might be perpetual if the discretionary distribution
rule was observed.
Forensic Accounting &

The 2006 Amendments

The Domestic Exceptions,
Wills, and Donative
Non-Trust Interests
For transactions that are not otherwise
excluded from the CSRAP and are not interests in trust or powers of appointment
with respect to all or any part of a trust,
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the 2006 amendments restate the ninety- prior CSRAP prohibition on clauses that
year wait-and-see rules, even for interests seek to extend the duration of the interest
created after the June 30, 2006 effective to a date that falls on the later of ninety
date of the amendments." The CSRAP al- years or the traditional
twenty-one year
47
ready enumerated situations that were perpetuity period.
excluded from the CSRAP and for which
the RAP was abolished. 44 However, there Interests in Trusts
The 2006 amendments eliminate most
are some remaining areas of concern.
Non-trust interests arising out of domes- remnants of the common law RAP as aptic situations are subject to the ninety- plied to interests in trust. 48 Unlike the
year rule. Non-trust interests created in a CSRAP, which still referred to the comwill, such as a testamentary power of ap- mon law RAP as an alternate method of
pointment, executory devises of real es- validating a nonvested interest (even if
tate, or concerns about the so-called "sloth- the focus was on the ninety-year alternaful executor,"4 5 are subject to the ninety- tive), the 2006 amendments ignore the
year rule. Interests created by a donative common law rules and prescribe only a
deed or other instrument of transfer are single limitation period of 1,000 years "in
gross." The 2006 amendments require
subject to the ninety-year rule.
Because the statute retains the USRAP close analysis in applying them to the difalternatives of required vesting or termi- ferent varieties of future interests dictatnation "no later than twenty-one years af- ed by their date of creation.
Trust Interests Created after June
ter the death of an individual who is then
alive; or ...within ninety years after its
30, 2006.If the trust interest is created afcreation" 46 the common law RAP remains ter June 30, 2006, a nonvested property
relevant to these interests. Unlike the in- interest is invalid only if it fails to vest or
terests in trusts that are discussed next, terminate within 1,000 years after its crefor these interests, the common "twenty- ation. 49 Similarly, a general power of apone years" saving clause remains appro- pointment not presently exercisable bepriate, because the statute repeats the cause of a condition precedent is invalid
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§§ 2514(d) and 2041(a)(3). 56 Although the
details are beyond the scope of this article,
the Code will convert a nongeneral power
of appointment that otherwise enjoys benign gift and estate tax treatment into a
potentially taxable general power of appointment if the exercise of the power of
appointment involves "creating another
power of appointment which under the
applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any
estate of interest in such property, or suspend the absolute ownership or power of
alienation of such property, for a period
ascertainablewithout regard to the date of
the creation of the firstpower."5 7 Limiting
the total term to 1,000 years from the creation of the trust and its powers sidesteps
this trap.
Drafting Trusts after June 30, 2006
For trusts created after June 30, 2006,
there are no transitional rules or elections. However, Colorado lawyers who did
not already grapple with the full impact of
the 2001 perpetual trust amendments
will need to reconsider how their trusts
will operate in an almost perpetual context, particularly with respect to issues of
choice of applicable law, early termination
clauses, and saving clauses.
Although the 1,000-year period is generous and the practical equivalent of a
perpetual trust, the RAP is not eliminated as a technical matter. If the trust is
structured to continue forever, it technically may bump up against the 1,000-year
limit. In that case, the statute will permit
a court to reform the trust "in the manner
that most closely approximates the trans58
feror's manifested plan of distribution."
Consequently, the standard saving clause
will need to be modified to serve as a controlled disposition of the trust assets
when the trust term reaches 1,000 years.
Even if a client does not want a dynasty
trust in near perpetuity and the trust's
fundamental distribution scheme will terminate it long before a millennium, it
probably will be the case that the standard saving clause tied to "21 years alter
the death of the last survivor of the group
composed of" will be supplanted in basic
wills and trusts by one tied to "1,000 years
after the date of the creation of this trust
59
[or the testator's date of death]."
That said, focusing on the 1,000-year
limit could prove to be inadequate in more
complex situations, if the trust becomes
subject to the laws of a state that follows
other approaches to this issue, such as the
common law RAP, USRAP, or permitting
entirely perpetual trusts. 60 Although it al-

Trust and Estate Law
ready was the case for many complex
trusts prior to the 2006 amendments, it
seems increasingly likely that saving
clauses will evolve to become more flexible-and complex-provisions that attempt to provide for possible alternative
multi-jurisdictional approaches to the
RAP issue. In light of the difficulty of
drafting such an all-inclusive clause, practitioners instead might see highly flexible
provisions that simply limit the duration
of the trust to "the longest period permitted by the law applicable to the trust."
Beyond saving clauses, the 2006 amendments do not increase the complexities of
trusts for lawyers who already were drafting perpetual trusts under the 2001
amendments or the laws of other states.
Such provisions are beyond the scope of
this article, but they include greater attention to termination of the trust on the
failure of descendants, termination for
lack of sufficient trust assets, choice of applicable law, and the use of trust protectors. 61 The underlying point of these concerns is that it rarely is possible to draft
for all circumstances for 100 years from
now, let alone 1,000 years into the future.
Indeed, it has been estimated that an average married couple with 2.1 children
would have more than 100 descendants
150 years after the trust is created, producing approximately 2,500 beneficiaries
250 years after the trust is created, 45,000
beneficiaries 350 years after the trust is
created, and 3.4 million beneficiaries 500
62
years after the trust is created.
Trusts CreatedAfter May 31, 2001
andBefore July 1, 2006.Trusts created
after May 31, 2001 and before July 1,
2006 will be subject to the same rules as
trusts created after June 30,2006, unless
the beneficiary of an affected interest or
the holder of an affected power of appointment files an election to block the retroactive application of the statute. 63 Apart
from offering greater choices of result, this
elective procedure counters arguments
that the statute has a retrospective impact prohibited by the Colorado constitution 64 or otherwise might violate constitutional prohibitions on impairments of contracts, substantive and procedural due
process, and takings of private property.65
This election applies to all interests in
pre-July 1, 2006 trusts impacted by the
2006 legislation.
Colorado lawyers who represent such
affected parties can file the statutorily
prescribed notice of election with the
trustee on or before July 1, 2008.66 The
statute expressly releases fiduciaries from

responsibility for not making the election.67 This exculpation might discourage
the trustee from notifying beneficiaries of
this election, possibly
raising procedural
6
due process claims.
Assuming that an affected party properly files the election notice with the
trustee, the election apparently would be
effective with nothing more. The statute
provides no qualitative standard of review. It could be expected that few of these
elections will be filed, because a post-May
31,2001 trust otherwise could be perpetual under the old law, or subject to the ninety-year wait-and-see period of the
CSRAP. It is hard to envision a current
beneficiary who would obtain a significant
advantage by making the election. If the
trust included a saving clause tied to lives
in being plus twenty-one years, the saving
clause would control the duration of the
trust and the 1,000-year limit would be
largely irrelevant. Only if the saving
clause already were expressed flexibly in
terms such as "the longest period permitted by the law applicable to the trust"
would the 1,000-year limit possibly extend the trust and deny a beneficiary his
or her terminating distribution, assuming
the trust was not drafted as a perpetual
trust from the outset under CSRAP.69
There are a number of possible outcomes of the 2006 amendments, but in
light of the long timelines, this discussion
has a highly impractical quality. Nevertheless, the statute does raise interesting
issues, such as
the treatment of unborn
70
beneficiaries.

Trusts CreatedAfter May 30, 1991
and Before June 1, 2001: Trusts that
were created after May 30, 1991 and before June 1, 2001 generally are subject to
rules that restate those that were in place
when the CSRAP first was adopted-notably the ninety-year wait-and-see period-so, at first blush little has changed for
these trusts.7 1 However, the amendments
extend the clarifying language discussed
earlier with respect to trusts created alter
June 30, 2006, addressing the timing of
the creation and the term of interests created through the exercise of powers of appointment. As is the case with trusts created after May 31,2001 and before July 1,
2006, the beneficiary of an affected interest or the holder of an affected power of
appointment can elect on or before July
1,
72
2008 that these provisions not apply

Trusts Created Before May 31, 1991:
Trusts created before May 31, 1991 would
remain subject to the common law RAP,
except that the reformation remedy of
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current law is retained for property interests created prior to May 31, 1991 that violate the common law RAP

3

However, as

discussed below, the exercise of a power of
appointment after June 30, 2006 usually
would invoke the new rules, including the
1,000-year limitation, even for a pre-May
31, 1991 trust (with an exception for
trusts irrevocable on September 25, 1985).
Accordingly, the right of the beneficiary of
an affected interest or the holder of an affected power of appointment to elect out of
the provisions on or before July 1, 2008
would apply here, as well.
The application of the new rules to preMay 31, 1991 trusts is somewhat intricate. The statute's effective date provides
that it applies to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is
created on or after May 31, 1991. 74 How-

ever, the statute provides that a nonvested property interest or power of appointment created by the exercise of a power of
appointment is created when the power is
exercised. 75 That rule will make the postJune 30, 2006 exercise of a power of appointment created in a pre-May 31, 1991
instrument generally subject to the new
rules.
The part of the statute prescribing the
1,000-year limitation applies to interests

in trust or powers of appointment created
after May 31, 2001, which essentially
would encompass all interests in trust
and powers of appointment created
through the exercise of a power of appointment after June 30, 2006.76 This is
buttressed by the language of the statute
that addresses exercises of powers of appointment, where the rule is repeated
that a nonvested property interest or power of appointment created by the exercise
of a power of appointment is created when
the power is exercised. 7 As discussed earlier in connection with trust interests created after June 30, 2006, the statute clarifies that a power of appointment created
through the exercise of a nongeneral power of appointment is considered created
when the first power of appointment was
created. 78 Accordingly, that interest must
vest within 1,000 years from the creation
of the trust.
There is another tax-driven exception to
the power of appointment rules. A nonvested property interest or power of appointment created by the exercise of a nongeneral power of appointment over any
part of a trust that was irrevocable on September 25,1985 is not made subject to the
1,000-year limitation, defaulting instead to
the ninety-year limitation of the new stat-

November

ute that resembles the CSRAP.7 9 This provision was included so that trusts (or portions of trusts) created prior to the effective
date of the federal generation-skipping
transfer tax do not lose that exemption on
account of a constructive addition to the
trust stemming from the exercise of a nongeneral power of appointment.8s

Conclusion
The 2006 amendments promise to almost eliminate the application of the RAP
to Colorado trusts as a practical matter, in
light of the new 1,000-year limit. The
amendments also confirm that the RAP
no longer will apply to most Colorado
commercial transactions. Nevertheless, in
light of complications such as effective
dates, exceptions for domestic transactions and non-trust interests, and questions of whether Colorado law applies to a
given transaction, the RAP cannot yet be
forgotten.

NOTES
1.See http'//www.leg.state.co.us; House Bill
("H.B.") 06-1137 (2006 Colo.Legis. Serv. Ch.
114). Unless stated otherwise, all citations to
the Colorado Revised Statutes are to the codification that will reflect the 2006 legislative session.
2. This phrase is not original with the author. See, e.g., Hess, "Freeing Property Owners
from the RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities," 62

Nondonative (commercial-type) Transfers
" Transfers prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory reformation remedy applies.
" The RAP does not apply to transfers after May 30, 1991.

Tenn. L.Rev. 267 (1995).

Domestic Situation Transfersand
Donative, Non-Trust Transfers
" Transfers prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory reformation remedy applies.
" Transfers after May 30, 1991 are subject to a ninety-year wait-and-see limitation.
Transfers in Trust (includingpowersof appointmentin trusts)
" Trusts created prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory reformation remedy applies.
" For trusts created prior to May 31, 1991 but after September 25, 1985, an exercise after June
30, 2006 of a power of appointment created under the trust is subject to a 1,000-year limitation. The exercise of a power of appointment created in a trust that was irrevocable as of
September 25, 1985 is subject to a ninety-year wait-and-see limitation. Beneficiaries have an
opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after May 30, 1991 but before June 1, 2001 are subject to a ninety-year waitand-see limitation. Beneficiaries have an opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after May 31, 2001 but before July 1, 2006 are subject to a 1,000-year limitation. Beneficiaries have an opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after June 30, 2006 are subject to a 1,000-year limitation.

(discussing the history of the statute and identifying 1607 as the applicable year).

Honorary Trusts and Pet Trusts
" Honorary trusts are subject to a twenty-one-year limitation.
* Pet trusts are limited to the life of the pet(s), plus the lives of any offspring in gestation at
the time the pet(s) become present beneficiaries.
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3. CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a).
4. See CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a)(I)-(VII).
5. CRS § 2-4-211.
6. See Chilcott v. Hart,45 P.391 (Colo. 1896)
7. See, e.g., Dukeminier et al., Wills, Trusts,

and Estates (New York, NY: Aspen Publishers,
2005) at 671-74.
8. See Chilcott, supra note 6 at 398 ("We

think that what is known as the modem rule
against perpetuities, viz. that a future estate
may be limited to take effect alter the termination of one or more lives in being and 21 years
and a fraction thereafter, is in force in this
state.").
9. Perry v. Brundage,614 P.2d 362, 366
(Colo. 1980).
10. See CRS § 38-30-110.
11. See CRS § 38-30-111.

12. See CRS §§ 15-11-1101 through -1107.
13. See 8 U.L.A_ 226 (1998) (comprising UPC
§§ 2-901-906). See also 8B U.L.A. 236 (2001)
(freestanding version).
14. See CRS § 15-11-1107(2).
15. See CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a). The official

comment to §4 of the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities ("JSRAP") states:
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Since the Common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is superseded by this Act... a nonvested property interest, power of appointment, or other arrangement excluded from
the Statutory Rule by this section is not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise.
8B U.L.A. 280 (2001). Section 12 of the 2006
amendments eliminates an exclusion from the
Colorado Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
Act ("CSRAP"), CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a)(VIII)
(2005), referring to "a reciprocal transfer" that
had raised questions as to whether the language included commercial transactions.
16.8B U.LA 280 (2001) (official comment to
USRAP § 4). The comment also notes that the
presence of consideration in a transaction that
is "essentially gratuitous in nature, accompanied by donative intent on the part of at least
one party to the transaction, is not to be regarded as nondonative simply because it is for
consideration." Id. at 281.
17. See, e.g., Hendrix, "Death of the Rule
Against Perpetuities in Commercial Transactions," 21 The Colorado Lawyer 475 (March
1992).
18. See, e.g., Argus Real Estate,Inc v. E-470
Pub.Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604 (Colo. 2005)
(transaction that occurred prior to the effective
date of the CSRAP was subject to the common
law RAP; resjudicataprecluded party from
raising a claim under the reformation rule of
the CSRAP in a subsequent proceeding).
19. For example, the official comment to
USRAP § 4 notes that the presence of consideration in a transaction that is "essentially gratuitous in nature, accompanied by donative intent on the part of at least one party to the
transaction, is not to be regarded as nondonative simply because it is for consideration." 8B
U.LA. 281 (2001) (official comment to USRAP
§ 4).
20. See Marsh, "Shouldn't We Just Simplify
the RAP?" 30 The ColoradoLawyer 57,58 n.1
(July 2001).
21. CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a)(I-VIII) (2005).
The "reciprocal transfer" category was the concern of Professor Marsh, as she believed it
might swallow up the commercial transaction
exemption.
22.8B U.LA 281 (2001) (official comment to
USRAP § 4).
23. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss the uncertain state of Colorado law applicable to purchase options and rights of first
refusal. See, e.g., Perry,supra note 9 (purchase
options and first rights of refusal can violate
the RAP); Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463
P.2d 297 (Colo. 1970) (right of first refusal unlimited in time can violate the RAP). But see
Cambridge Co. v. E. Slope Investment Corp.,
700 P2d 537 (Colo. 1985) (perpetual first right
of refusal may not be subject to RAP).
24. See CRS § 15-11-1106(1) and (2) (2005).
Also, interests such as rights of reverter, which
were considered vested and not subject to RAP,
may be excluded under the general exclusion
of"[a] property interest, power of appointment,
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or arrangement that was not subject to the
common-law rule against perpetuities." CRS
§ 15-11-1106(1)(g) (2005).
25. CRS § 38-33.3-203(2). See Skillern,"Rule
Against Perpetuities" § 72.29, in Krendl, ColoradoMethods of Practice(St. Paul, MN: West
Group, 1998).
26.8 U.LA. 239 (1998).
27. See CRS § 15-11-901.
28. For a discussion of the common law
treatment of pet trusts and the Colorado statute see Heller, "Trusts for Pets," 26 The Colorado Lawyer 71 (March 1997). At least one
Colorado case involved a trust with a canine
beneficiary, but the court avoided the larger issue of the validity of pet trusts by finding the
beneficiary language to be precatory in nature.
See In re Forrester'sEstate, 279 P. 721 (Colo.
1929).
29. CRS § 15-11-1102(1)(c) (2005).
30. One might assume that the 2001 amendment was to apply only to trusts settled after
the effective date, to avoid arguments that the
statute had a retrospective impact on a beneficiary,which would violate Article II, § 11, of the
Colorado Constitution's proscription of a law
"retrospective in its operation." CompareLake
of the Woods Assn. v. McHugh, 380 S.E.2d 872
(Va. 1989) (barring a retroactive application of
the USRAP to save a first right of refusal that
otherwise was invalid under the RAP). Even if
it might be argued that the statute could have
retroactive effect, it might not be of practical
importance if the trust had a standard saving
clause that terminated the trust on the same
period as the common law RAP. Indeed, the
CSRAP prohibition on saving clauses that
would use the longer of the common law RAP
period or ninety years would ensure that result. See CRS § 15-11-1102(5) (2005).

31. See, e.g., Stover, "Why Not Repeal the
Rule Against Perpetuities?" 30 The Colorado
Lawyer 58,60 n. 7 (July 2001) ("apparently...
a nondiscretionary simple trust would still be
subject to the [RAP]"). A discussion of the
Alaskan RAP provisions from which the 2001
amendments were drawn raised the issue of
whether so-called "Crummey" withdrawal
rights might render a trust nondiscretionary
and invalid. See Greer, "The Alaska Dynasty
Trust," 18Alaska L Rev. 253,278 (2001).
32. Several states have adopted statutes or
follow common law doctrine that restrict the
period over which income can be accumulated
in trust. See, e.g., Sitkoff, "The Lurking Rule
Against Accumulations of Income," 100 Nw. U
L.Rev. 501 (2006). The 2001 amendments to
the CSRAP did not permit the creation of a
perpetual trust unless distributions could be
made to a beneficiary living at the time of the
creation of the trust. That aspect now is absent
from the Colorado RAP statute after the 2006
amendments, and it does not appear that Colorado law otherwise has adopted a prohibition
on the long-term accumulation of income in
trust.
33. Qualified terminable interest property
("QTIP")is described in IRC § 2056(b)(7).
34. As discussed later, this limitation was
wise in terms of avoiding creating a so-called
"Delaware Tax Trap" effect. See infra notes
54-57 and accompanying text.
35. See CRS § 15-11-1106(1)(2005).
36. The CSRAP validates a nonvested interest if it either meets the common law rule or
vests or terminates within ninety years after
its creation. See CRS § 15-11-1102(lXa) and (b)
(2005).
37. See H.B. 06-1137, § 12 (amending CRS
§ 15-11-1105).
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38. See supra note 20 and accompanying
departs from the Colorado powers of appointtext.
ment definitions that classify these powers as
39. See H.B. 06-1137, § 12 (amending CRS "special" powers. See CRS § 15-2-103(2). How§ 15-11-1105(1)).
ever, "nongeneral" powers are used in at least
40. Id. at § 14 (amending CRS § 15-11-1107 two probate code sections without defining the
(2)). A technical amendment is being considterm. See CRS §§ 15-11-803(3Xa)(ii) and 15-11ered to add the italicized words below to CRS 804(2)(a)(ii).
52. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(1)(b)(Ill).
§ 15-11-1107(2):
This part 11 supersedes and abolishes the
53. Colorado has parted ways with other
rule of the common law known as the rule states, notably Alaska, that apply a 1,000-year
against perpetuities for nonvested interests limit to powers of appointment, but otherwise
and powers of appointmentcreated on or af- permit a perpetual trust provided that the
power of alienation is not suspended, which is
ter May 31, 1991.
An explanation is beyond the scope of this ar- accomplished by giving the trustee a power to
ticle.
sell trust assets. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
41. A recent commentary identified Colorado §§ 34.27.051, 34.27.053, and 34.27.100. The
as one of a few states where contingent re- Wisconsin RAP statute permits a perpetual
mainders still are inalienable inter vivos, but it trust if the power of alienation is not suspendis fair to say that Colorado law in this area is ed, and in a case of first impression, the U.S.
not clear. See Gallanis, "The Future of Future Tax Court held that this did not produce an adverse result in terms of the so-called "Delaware
Interests," 60 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 513, 517-19
(2003), citing Barry v. Newton, 273 P. 2d 735 Tax Trap" discussed later.See Estate ofMurphy
(1954); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Argus v. Comm'r, 71 TC. 671 (1979).
Real Estate Partners, Inc., 70 P. 3d 481
54. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(3)(a). The exer(ColoApp. 2002), citing with approval the po- cise of a power of appointment in a trust creatsition in Barry v. Newton. For a discussion of ed prior to June 1,2006 consequently could inthe Colorado law dealing with the transmissi- voke the new rules with respect to the affected
property, if it were not for some additional spebility of future interests such as reversions,
vested remainders, possibilities of reverter, cial rules discussed later.
rights of entry for condition broken, contingent
55. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(3)(b).
remainders and executory interests, see
56. See Dukeminier and Krier, "The Rise of
Skillern, supra note 25, "Future Interests," §§ the Perpetual Trust," 50 UCLA L.Rev. 1303,
72.21-26. Colorado law, for example, does not
1332-35 (2003); Greer, 'The Delaware Tax Trap
permit the assignment of rights of reverter. and the Abolition of the Rule Against PerpetuSee, e.g., Denver & S.F R'y. Co. v.School Dist. ities," 28 Est.Plan.68 (Feb. 2001).
No. 22 in Arapahoe County, 23 P.978 (Colo.
57. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (emphasis added).
1890); Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 88 P.2d 120
58. CRS § 15-11-1104.5(1).
(Colo. 1939).
59. In drafting basic trusts subject to Colo42. See, eg., Perry,supra note 9 (purchase op- rado law, it probably is the case that attorneys
tion not unreasonable restraint on alienation no longer routinely should use the "21 years afunder the facts).
ter the death . . ." saving clause, and that
43. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(2).
should be conformed to the 1,000-year limit.
44. See CRS § 15-11-1105(1)(a)-(g) (2005).
However, in the context of wills, that saving
45. The RAP doctrine had its cast ofimprob- clause would not address nonvested, non-trust
able characters, such as the fertile octogenariinterests created under a will that would be
an and the unborn widow. A Colorado case ap- governed by the ninety-year limitation period
plied the rule of the "slothful executor" to inval- of the CSRAP discussed in the previous secidate a bequest that was postponed until "the tion. Therefore, practitioners might expect
admission of this will to probate." Miller v. greater use of flexible clauses described in the
Weston, 189 P.610,611 (Colo. 1920).
next paragraph of the text.
46. CRS § 15-11-1102.5(2)(b)(I).
60. Some of the states that permit perpetual
47. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(2)(b)(V).
trusts (for example, South Dakota, Wisconsin,
48. The influence of the common law RAP re- and Alaska) require that the power of alienmains in the honorary trust provisions that ation not be suspended indefinitely, which ofstill refer to a twenty-one-year term of the ten is satisfied by granting the trustee a powtrust. See CRS § 15-11-901. This article does er to sell trust assets. Although it is difficult to
not evaluate the wisdom of eliminating the draft for all of these possible outcomes, the inRAP. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 20; Thomp- clusion of such a power of sale could be helpful
son, "A Banker's Perspective on the Repeal of in case the trust situs migrates to that type of
the RAP in Colorado," 30 The ColoradoLawyer jurisdiction.
61 (July 2001); Stover, supra note 31; Dobris,
61. See generallyNenno,"Planning With Per"The Death of the Rule of Perpetuities, or the petual Dynasty Trusts," SL030 ALI-ABA 1195
RAP Has No Friends-An Essay," 35 Real. (Nov. 2005).
Prop.Prob.& Tr J 601 (Fall 2000).
62. See News Release, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
49. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(1)(bXI).
50. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(1)(b)(ll).
"Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
51. This language is used for tax purposes in
Is Law in 26 States--Move of a Few States to
Abolish the Rule In Order to Facilitate Perpetconnection with IRC §§ 2041 and 2514, but it
82 / The Colorado Lawyer / November 2006 / Vol. 35, No. 11

November

ual (Dynasty) Trusts is Ill-Advised," (Jan.
2000). See generally Dukeminier and Krier,
supra note 56 (discussing potential problems
arising from perpetual trusts).
63. See CRS § 15-11-1106.5.
64. See supranote 30.
65. Although these issues are beyond the
scope of this article, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions dealing with title clearing legislation
might provide some guidance. See, e.g., exac,
Ina v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (title clearing
statute that caused mineral interests to revert
to the surface owner unless a claim was filed
within two years after the enactment of the
statute was upheld against claims of violation
of substantive due process, procedural due
process, equal protection, impairment of contracts, and takings); United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84 (1985) (statute providing for extinguishment of an unpatented mineral claim upon a failure to register within three years after
the statute's enactment held not a taking or a
violation of substantive or procedural due
process); Gerneru Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo.
1989) (statute rendering eighteen years as conclusive evidence of ownership for adverse possession was not a taking under state or federal
constitutions). However, this line of cases must
be reconciled with the Court's decisions invalidating a title clearing statute impacting Indian
lands. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987);
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). Thanks
to Professor Howard KIlemme for his insights
collected in his forthcoming book, Takings,
Substantive Due Process,and the Regulatory
Roles of Government.
66. See CRS § 15-11-1106.5(2)(b).
67. See CRS § 15-11-1106.5(3).
68. Again, this is beyond the scope of this article, but trust and estate lawyers will recall
the U.S. Supreme Court's determination that a
probate claim statute violated procedural due
process for inadequate notice. See Tulsa Prof
Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988).
69. However, if the saving clause does not extend to exercises of powers of appointment, the
2006 amendments could permit the creation of
new interests by the exercise of a power of appointment that would extend for 1,000 years
from the date of the creation of the trust, beyond the period permitted by the CSRAP.
70. Apparently the statute aims to preclude
all opt-out elections after July 1, 2008. Although Colorado has codified the equitable doctrine of "virtual representation," a living beneficiary's election apparently would not represent the interests of an unborn beneficiary,
because the election procedure is not a judicial
proceeding and without more would not result
in an "order." It is beyond the scope of this article to compare the common law requirements
of virtual representation to those applied by
the statute and to conclude whether the Colorado statute has fully supplanted the common
law doctrine that otherwise might require less
formal actions. See CRS § 15-10-403(3)(d) and
(5):
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An unborn, unascertained, minor or incapacitated person who is not otherwise represented is bound by an order to the extent his
or her interest is adequately represented by
another party having a substantially identical interest in the proceeding.... At any
point in a proceeding, a court may appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the interest
of a minor, an incapacitated, or unascertained person, or a person whose identity is
unknown....

See also Wade, 'Trust Termination and Modification," 15 The Colorado Lawyer 389, 391
(March 1986).
71. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(2).
72. The statute completely repeals CRS
§§ 15-11-1102 and 1104 (2005) as of July 1,
2008, arguably even for affected interests that
might opt out of the replacement sections, CRS
§§ 15-11-1102.5 and 1104.5.
73. See CRS § 15-11-1106(2).
74. See CRS § 15-11-1106(1).

75.Id.
76. See CRS § 15-11-110 2 .5(1)(a).
77. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(3)(a).
78. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(3)(b).
79. See CRS § 15-11-1102.5(3)(c)(I) and (H).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)
(the exercise of the power cannot suspend or
postpone vesting beyond ninety years from the
date of creation of the trust). U
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